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Abstract 
Effective  enforcement  and  compliance  with  EU 
law  is  not  just  a  legal  necessity,  it  is  also  of 
economic interest since the potential of the Single 
Market  will  be  fully  exploited.  Enforcement 
barriers generate unjustified costs and hindrances 
or  uncertainty  for  cross-border  business  and 
might deprive consumers from receiving the full 
benefit of greater choice and/or cheaper offers. 
The  EU  has  developed  several  types  of 
enforcement  efforts  (preventive  initiatives,  pre-
infringement  initiatives  and  formal  infringement 
procedures).  More  recently,  the  emphasis  is  on 
effective prevention. 
This CEPS Policy Brief analyses the functioning of 
one  preventive mechanism  (the  98/34 Directive) 
and  assesses  its  potential  to  detect  and  prevent 
technical or other barriers in the course of the last 
25  years.  Based  on  an  empirical  approach,  it 
shows  that  this  amazing  mechanism  has 
successfully prevented thousands of new technical 
barriers from arising in the internal goods market.
Introduction 
Besides  problems  lingering  in  the  EU  internal 
market, there is also good news. This CEPS Policy 
Brief  highlights  one  of  the  silent,  yet  amazing 
successes  in  the  internal  goods  market,  namely, 
the  pre-emption  of  new  technical  barriers  from 
arising. Although the focus in EU policy circles is, 
perhaps  understandably,  on  the  removal  of 
existing  technical  barriers  via  case-law,  mutual 
recognition,  harmonisation  and  European 
standardization,  it  is  far  too  little  realized  that 
member states still legislate many technical laws 
that may potentially erect new technical barriers in 
the  internal  goods  market.  The  EU  mechanism 
pre-empting  such  incipient  barriers  from  arising 
and  from  (re-)fragmenting  the  single  goods 
market  is  amazing  in  a  number  of  ways:  it  is 
institutionally  powerful,  bureaucratically  ‘light’, 
fairly  transparent  and,  above  all,  highly 
successful.  The  appreciation  of  this  success 
deepens once one realizes how many barriers are 
pre-empted  annually  and  how  profoundly  the 
single  goods  market  would  have  been  re-2 | CORREIA DE BRITO & PELKMANS 
 
fragmented,  had  the  mechanism  never  existed. 
Section 1 describes the mechanism, known as the 
98/34  procedure,  followed  (in  section  2)  by  an 
analysis of its impressive record ever since the late 
1980s.  Section  3  zooms  in,  by  country  and  by 
sector,  on  the  most  recent  empirical  evidence 
(2010  and  2011).  In  section  4  we  develop  and 
employ some indicators to better track how many 
technical  barriers  have  actually  been  prevented, 
insofar as data allows. In section 5 we conclude. 
1.  The 98/34 mechanism: How national 
technical regulation is disciplined  
Under  Directive  98/34/EC1  (twice  revised  and 
formerly  known  as  83/189),  the  European 
Commission  receives  compulsory  notifications 
from the member states of all national draft laws 
containing technical regulations (on goods and, a 
minor part, on information society services). The 
notified national draft  laws are verified so as to 
enable  the  Commission  as  well  as  the  member 
states to detect potential (new) technical barriers 
or  other  (new)  regulatory  barriers  to  intra-EU 
cross-border trade. Subsequently, the Commission 
requests the relevant member states to amend the 
draft so as to prevent such (potential) barriers.  
This unique and most remarkable instrument has 
protected  the  internal  goods  market  from 
becoming  a  mockery  over  time.  The  98/34/EC 
mechanism is remarkable for at least two reasons. 
First,  member  states  temporarily  renounce  their 
sovereign  right  and  freedom  to  legislate  as  and 
when  they  want.  A  notification  automatically 
postpones  the  conclusion  of  domestic  pre-
legislative  procedures  for  three  months,  i.e.  the 
draft  cannot  be  adopted  before  the  end  of  this 
standstill period. However, such standstill period 
may be prolonged to four or six months. In case of 
a blockage (i.e. when the Commission announces 
that the proposal concerns a matter that is covered 
by a proposal for an EU directive, regulation or 
decision),  it  may  reach  twelve  months.  If  the 
Council  adopts  a  common  position,  the national 
legislative  procedure  is  blocked  for  18  months. 
                                                   
1 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for 
the  provision  of  information  in  the  field  of  technical 
standards and regulations. The Directive was amended by 
Directive  98/48/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of 
the Council of 20 July 1998, which extended the system to 
include Information Society Services.  
This is an effective way to prevent new technical 
barriers  from  arising.  Second,  notification  is  not 
only  compulsory  but  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  (CJEU)  has  explicitly  ruled  (in 
CIA  Security  International,  19962)  that  non-
notification  renders  the  national  law,  adopted 
subsequently,  inapplicable  and,  consequently, 
‘unenforceable’ against individuals. Again, such a 
ruling  provides  strong  incentives  to  notify, 
thereby raising the credibility of 98/34 even more.  
What is typically notified? Basically, all national 
technical regulations together with an explanation 
of the necessity to make such regulations, if this is 
not clear in the draft, unless the regulations are a 
simple transposition of international requirements 
or European directives. It is hard to ‘guesstimate’ 
what the economic significance of this domain is, 
but a rough proxy would be nearly 20% of intra-
EU  trade  in  goods.  However,  one  has  to 
appreciate the precise meaning of this. The regular 
Commission  reports  on  Directive  98/34/EC3 
speak  of  goods  in  the  non-harmonized  field  as 
well as in the harmonized field. The latter refer to 
secondary  national  legislation  that  elaborates 
principles  and  specifications  in  EU  directives. 
Depending  on  the situation,  member  states  may 
exercise considerable discretion in this area, and 
98/34 procedure verifies whether that discretion 
is  being  used  in  ways  that  create  unnecessary 
divergences or incompatibilities with the relevant 
directive(s).  In  other  words,  it  disciplines  at  EU 
level  the  national  regulatory  autonomy  first 
allowed in the directive, such that no new barriers 
to the internal goods market emerge.  
National notifications, sent to the Commission, are 
automatically  transferred  to  the  national 
representatives in the 98/34 Committee (which is 
chaired  by  the  Commission).  It  is  expected  that 
both  the  Commission  and  the  member  states 
carefully screen the notifications and, if they see a 
reason, make observations of two kinds: 
  ‘Comments’ are advisory in nature and/or ask 
for  clarification  so  as  to  ensure  that  no  new 
barrier might arise from the draft law at stake 
and  should  be  taken  into  account  by  the 
notifying EU country ‘as far as possible’. 
                                                   
2 Case C-194/94 ‘CIA Security’ (1996) ECR I-2201. 
3 Such as the latest ones: COM(2009) 690 of 21 Dec. 2009 
(on 2006 – 2008) and COM (2011) 853 of 7 Dec. 2011 (on 
2009 and 2010), for example. PRE-EMPTING TECHNICAL BARRIERS IN THE SINGLE MARKET | 3 
 
  ‘Detailed  opinions’  argue  why  the  draft  law 
risks  erecting  one  or  more  new  technical 
barriers,  which  is  the  basis  for  automatically 
suspending national legislative procedures for 
another 3 months, and the notifying member 
state must report to the Commission the action 
it intends to take to remedy the problem. 
In actual practice, the borderline between the two 
types  of  observations  may  be  a  little  fuzzy.  The 
transparency of the process has much improved 
over  time.  A  Commission  website  called  TRIS4 
reports all notifications in summary form (usually 
in English), with links to the full text. In principle, 
therefore, business and all interested associations 
and individuals have the possibility to track the 
process and identify cases of interest to them.  
2.  The amazing track record of 98/34: 
Empirical trend 
How  critical  the  98/34  mechanism  has  been  for 
the protection of the internal goods market can be 
seen  from  Figures  1  and  2,  which  show  the 
number of the notifications over the period 1988–
2010. The regulatory activity of member states in 
this  narrow  field  of  goods  legislation  is 
considerable. In the period of the EU-12 (1988–94), 
annual notifications hovered between 300 and 400 
and  many  of  these  prompted  observations  from 
the  Commission  and/or  member  states, 
suspecting potential barriers. During the period of 
the EU-15 (1995–2003), notifications start to rise to 
(sometimes  far)  beyond  500  a  year.5  A  further 
structural increase can be observed after the first 
and  second  Eastern  enlargement  (2004–10), 
approaching an annual average of around 700 a 
year. 
                                                   
4  TRIS  stands  for  a  Technical  Regulations  Information 
System and is a database which facilitates the notification 
system  under  Directive  98/34/EC.  On  the  publicly 
available website, one can find all the relevant information 
on  the  procedure,  including  notified  draft  laws  and 
subscription  to  a  regular  alert  system  on  the  latest 
notifications.  (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/tris/default.htm?CFID=8
295454&CFTOKEN=e9e11cc0c490dce-FBEB12B6-036B-
4761-A48052BC73431FA0).  
5  The  extreme  peak  in  1997  is  due  to  the  Netherlands, 
suddenly realizing the consequences of the CIA Security 
case.  It  was  catching  up  in  1997  with  400  extra 
notifications  which  it  first  felt  were  unnecessary.  For 
details of this ‘regulatory-crisis’, see Box 1 in Pelkmans et 
al. (2000, pp. 270-271). 
Figure 1. Trends in notifications of national draft laws 
under 98/34, 1988-98 
 
Source:  Pelkmans  et  al.  (2000,  p.  274),  based  on 
Commission reports. 
Figure 2. Trends in notifications of national draft laws 
under 98/34, 1999-2010 
 
Notes:  2004:  enlargement  from  EU-15  to  EU-25;  2007: 
enlargement from EU-25 to EU-27. 
Sources:  Pelkmans  (2007);  SEC(2009)  1704  of  21  Dec 
2009 and SEC(2011) 1509 of 7 Dec 2011. 
In short, for already one and a half decades, the 
notifications number more than 500 a year, with a 
recent  trend  of  700.  This  amounts  to  unique 
empirical  evidence  on  the  high,  if  not  secularly 
increasing,  regulatory  activity  of  member  states. 
In  Europe  the  shift  to  more  and  more  EU 
regulation,  at  the  expense  of  national  regulation 
(at  least  in  goods),  is  frequently  discussed.  This 
trend is widely accepted as inevitable, given the 
ambition of creating and maintaining a deep and 
smoothly  functioning  internal  (here:  mainly 
goods)  market.  One  of  the  repercussions  is  that 
member  states  (as  well  as  business  and  even 
citizens) have (rightly) become quite sensitive to 
the need for EU regulation to be carefully justified, 
least-cost  and  well-designed  based  on  strict  EU 
regulatory impact assessment.  
What  is  rarely  considered,  however,  is  what 
member  states  themselves  do  in  the  areas 
remaining  under  national  regulatory  autonomy, 
for the simple reason that there is no easy way to 
‘observe’ such trends. The 98/34 mechanism gives 
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analysts  unique  (though partial,  for  goods  only) 
empirical evidence about how member states use 
their autonomy in goods markets. The inference is 
clear: member states remain very eager regulators. 
Yet, this eagerness creates serious risks of newly 
emerging  technical  or  other  regulatory  barriers, 
which  might  be  difficult,  slow  and  costly  to 
remove  again.  Hence,  the  justification  of  the 
intrusive 98/34 mechanism which does not reduce 
national regulatory autonomy but disciplines it for 
the  sake  of  the  internal  goods  market.  It  is 
important  that  the  member  states  jointly  have 
assumed  ‘ownership’  in  the  98/34  Committee 
since they all can (and do) make observations on 
the  draft  laws  of  other  member  states,  whilst 
being disciplined themselves as well.  
The  effectiveness  of  98/34  in  protecting  the 
internal  goods  market  can  be  appreciated  once 
one  zooms  in  on  the  actual  working  of  the 
procedure. No less than some 12,500 notifications 
have  been  dealt  with  since  1988  (until  2010 
inclusive).  One  might  assume  that,  once  the 
mechanism  is  well-known  inside  the  national 
administration  (between  ministries  –  which 
requires  coordination  carried  out  in  practice  by 
national enquiry points), the mere existence of the 
mechanism  should  already  exercise  some 
disciplinary  effect.  Thus,  one  should  expect  the 
potential barriers detected in 98/34 procedures to 
be a good deal less (in terms of draft laws)6 than 
12,500.  Even  so,  thousands  of  potential  barriers 
have  been  prevented  in  these  23  years,  as 
graphically substantiated in Figures 1 and 2. The 
98/34  procedure  allows  greater  precision  with 
respect  to  the  number  of  prevented  barriers.  As 
noted,  member  states  and  the  European 
Commission can make two types of observations 
on  notified  draft  laws:  “comments”  and  “detailed 
opinions”.7  
Figure  3  provides  empirical  evidence  for  the 
period  2004–10  inclusive.  The  comments  over 
these  7  years  amount  to  1,142  for  the  member 
states and 1,113 for the Commission. Even if one 
                                                   
6 Of course, a single draft law may well contain more than 
one  or indeed  many  (potential)  technical barriers.  Here, 
we simplify by assuming that one law can be tantamount 
to one (potential) barrier. 
7  The  Commission  can  also  block  a  draft  law  in  case 
relevant harmonization work is already under way or due 
to be undertaken. This leads to a suspension of 12 months, 
giving time for the preparation of a draft directive.  
(rather  generously)  assumes  that  none  of  these 
instances would have given rise to later barriers, 
the  procedure  undoubtedly  increases  legal 
certainty  for  business,  which  is  a  much 
appreciated  gain  (lowering  information  costs). 
Were one to assume that some of the draft laws 
having  been  ‘commented’  on  would  have  given 
rise  to  barriers,  the  beneficial  impact  of  98/34 
would be so much bigger. It seems reasonable to 
presume  that  the  latter  assumption  is  probably 
correct. The ‘detailed opinions’ identify potential 
future barriers. The member states identified over 
the seven years no less than 366 such instances, 
and  the Commission  402.  One  cannot  add  these 
totals because many detailed opinions of member 
states may well be on the same draft laws and are 
likely to overlap with detailed opinions from the 
Commission;  usually,  the  Commission  list  is 
larger than the number of draft laws identified as 
problematic by member states. 
Figure  3.  Detection  of  potential  regulatory  barriers 
under 98/34, 2004-10 
 
Sources: SEC(2007)350 of 21 March 2007, SEC(2009)1704 of 
21 Dec. 2009 and SEC(2011)1509 of 7 Dec 2011. 
On this basis, one can conclude that no less than 
400 national draft laws were temporarily stopped 
by ‘detailed opinions’, indicating a serious risk of 
emerging technical barriers in the internal goods 
market.  Moreover,  the  experience  shows  that  a 
significant chunk of identified potential problems 
can be solved in a dialogue between the notifying 
member  state  and  the  Commission  or  another 
member state that issued a comment or a detailed 
opinion. This amazing record shows how crucial 
98/34  is  for  keeping  the  internal  market  from 
deteriorating by preventing a groundswell of new 
technical barriers. With even more detailed data 
below,  we  shall  construct  and  calculate  an 
“effective prevention indicator” showing the proven 
performance  of  98/34  in  pre-empting  what 
otherwise  would  have  become  ‘new’  barriers  in 
the single goods market. This prevention comes in 
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addition to the probably growing awareness and 
increased  discipline  inside  ministries  as  well  as 
the  deterrence  effect  of  notification  and  analysis 
by other member states and the Commission. 
3.  Recent empirical evidence: EU 
countries and sectors 
We provide empirical evidence for 2010 and 2011. 
The  data  shown  in  the  present  subsection  are 
taken  from  the  TRIS  database  as  it  stood  mid-
March 2012. We first exhibit notification trends by 
EU member states, followed by an identification 
of the sectors attracting the most notifications over 
the  years.  The  number  of  notifications  in  2011 
declined to 675, from 817 in 2010. The 2011 total is 
roughly at the average level since 2005, showing a 
stable trend line. Figure 4 demonstrates that EU 
member states exhibit considerable differences in 
their propensity to notify in the years 2010-2011, 
that is, to regulate either in the non-harmonized, 
or  harmonized  field  or  in  both.  Whereas  10  EU 
countries  notified  20  draft  laws  or  less  over  the 
two  years  together,  four  member  states  reach 
beyond  100,  with  a  peak  of  162  notifications  by 
France.  
Figure 4. Total number of notifications by EU member state, 2010-11 
 
 
No less than 11 member states recorded more than 
5% of total notifications in 2010. In 2011 this group 
shrank to seven EU countries, signalling a more 
even  pattern  of  notifications.  In  the  reactions  to 
notifications,  there  is  a  possibly  interesting 
contrast  between  the  Commission  and  the 
member states. Whereas the Commission seems to 
have  become  more  vigilant  and/or  projects 
notified  were  regarded  as  more  problematic 
(comments going up from 108 in 2010 to 112 in 
2011,  despite  fewer  notifications,  and  detailed 
opinions going up from 48 to 56), member states’ 
responses  decline  in  number,  in  line  with  the 
decline  of  the  total  (comments  decreasing  from 
176 in 2010 to 147 in 2011, and detailed opinions 
going down as well from 49 in 2010 to 46 in 2011).  
When  focusing  on sectors,  it  is  telling  that  only 
relatively  few  sectors  attract  the  bulk  of  the 
notifications. Apparently, the national propensity 
to  regulate  is  extremely  unevenly  distributed 
between  sectors.  There  are  indications  that  the 
same sectors have been in the lead for decades. In 
2010  and  2011,  the  first  three  sectors  were 
agriculture and foodstuffs, building products and 
telecommunications,  followed  by  transport, 
mechanics and environment and packaging.  
Agricultural and foodstuff were the sectors with 
the  highest  number  of  notifications  attracting 
comments and/or detailed opinions (134 notified 
draft  regulations)  over  the  period  2010-11.  The 
subjects covered included, among others, labelling 
of  foodstuffs,  food  supplements,  origin  of 
products, food hygiene, composition of foodstuffs 
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and  beverages,  materials  intended  to  come  into 
contact with foodstuffs, mineral, spring and drink 
waters  for  human  consumption,  equipment  for 
treatment  of  water  for  human  consumption  and 
measures  on  genetically  modified  organisms 
(GMOs).  The  EU  legislation  on  GMOs  includes, 
among  others,  Directive  2001/18/EC8  on  the 
deliberate  release  into  the  environment  of 
genetically  modified  organisms,  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1829/20039 on genetically modified food and 
feed,  Regulation  (EC)  No  1830/200310  on  the 
traceability  of  food  and  feed  products produced 
from  genetically  modified  organisms  and 
Commission  Recommendation  on  co-existence 
measures 2010/C 200/01.11  
No less than 68 draft technical regulations in the 
field  of  building  and  construction  attracted 
detailed opinions/comments by the Commission 
and the member states. A great part of these draft 
notified  regulations  are  concerned  with 
firefighting  equipment,  supporting  structures 
made from concrete, dangerous substances, their 
properties  and  labelling.  The  building  and 
construction  sector  is  regulated  at  EU  level  by 
Directive 89/106/EEC12 on construction products 
and  Directive  2010/31/EU.13  Classification, 
packaging  and  labelling  of  dangerous 
                                                   
8 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into 
the  environment  genetically  modified  organisms  and 
repealing Council Directive 90/220/EC. 
9  Regulation  (EC)  No  1829/2003  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed products. 
10  Regulation  (EC)  No  1830/2003  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  September  2003, 
concerning  the  traceability  and  labelling  of  genetically 
modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed 
products produced from genetically modified organisms 
and amending Directive 2001/18/EC. 
11  Commission  Recommendation  2010/C  200/01,  of  13 
July 2010 on guidelines for the development of national 
co-existence measures to avoid the unintended presence 
of GMOs in conventional and organic crops. 
12 Directive 89/106/EEC Council Directive of 21 December 
1988  on  the  approximation  of  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative provisions of the member states relating to 
construction products.  
13 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 May on the energy performance of 
buildings. 
preparations are regulated in the Regulation (EC) 
No 1272/2008.14 
The third sector with a higher number of notified 
draft  regulations  attracting  detailed  opinions 
and/or  comments  was  the  telecommunications 
sector  (47  notifications),  mainly  radio  interfaces. 
This  is  a  sector  in  which  rapid  technology 
developments  in  recent  years  has  resulted  in 
increasingly complex national regulations, which 
could  potentially  create  barriers  within  the 
internal market. The three sectors ranking 4 – 6 in 
this respect are transport (45), mechanics (39) and 
environment and packaging (30).  
Going back to, say, 2002-05,15one finds the same 
group  of  sectors  attracting  the  most  comments 
and/or  detailed  opinions:  as  in  2010-11, 
agriculture  and  foodstuffs  is  on  top,  telecoms  is 
second,  followed  by  transport,  construction, 
energy and mechanical engineering. Of these six, 
only energy is different. Going back even further 
in the history of 98/34, over the entire period 1984 
(when Directive 83/189, the predecessor of 98/34, 
came into force) to 1998 inclusive, the top five are 
once again the same sectors as found in 2010-11 
(although with a different ranking) and practically 
the  same  as  during  2002-05:  machinery  & 
engineering  (20%  of  notifications),  agriculture  & 
food  (16%),  telecoms  (16%),  transport  (15%)  and 
building products and construction (12%).16 
4.  Minimum actual prevention: 
Empirical evidence for 2010-11 
The  98/34  procedure  is  about  effective  pre-
emption  of  new  technical  barriers.  The 
effectiveness of 98/34 comes about in three ways. 
One  is  through  the  very  existence  of  the 
mechanism for more than 25 years now, which is 
bound to have induced some degree of discipline 
and  efforts  to  ensure  EU  legal  compatibility  in 
ministries  in  all  EU  member  states.  The  second 
way is via the working of the 98/34 notification 
                                                   
14  Regulation  (EC)  No  1272/2008  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008, on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures  (REACH),  amending  and  repealing  Directives 
67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1907/2006.  
15 See COM(2007) 125 of 21 March 2007, The operation of 
Directive 98/34/EC from 2002-05, and SEC (2007) 350 of 
the same date. 
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procedure  which  has  gradually  engendered  a 
greater ‘Europeanization’ of domestic law-making 
by  the  permanent  institutional  machinery  to 
comment on drafts of other EU countries, and to 
identify instances of potential and likely ‘barriers’ 
springing from draft laws which have no mutual 
recognition  clauses  or  comprise  other  (too) 
restrictive  ways  to  pursue  health,  safety  or 
environmental  objectives.  These  two  beneficial 
effects  of  Directive  98/34  cannot  be  empirically 
verified  in  any  meaningful  way,  although  that 
does not mean that they are not real.  
A third effect can be verified empirically with the 
help of three proxy measures. We refer to barriers 
that were actually prevented via the comments and 
especially  the  detailed  opinions.  Given  that  the 
two  other  ways  of  achieving  the  prevention  of 
new  technical  barriers  cannot  be  measured 
quantitatively, the following exercise can safely be 
considered  as  the  minimum  prevention 
accomplished;  the  actual  prevention  is  almost 
certainly much greater but cannot be verified. In 
the  following  we  assume,  for  the  sake  of 
simplicity, that a detailed opinion is tantamount 
to ‘a barrier prevented’ which is in actual practice 
very  often  the  case.  More  generally,  comments 
may  also  point  to  issues  or  a  potential  for  later 
problems  or  overly  complicated  or  heavy 
bureaucracy, etc., but comments may just as well 
provide  advice  or  comparisons  with  solutions 
found  elsewhere.  By  zooming  in  on  comments 
and  in  particular,  on  detailed  opinions,  it  is 
possible to calculate the ‘proven prevention’ in the 
annual functioning of the 98/34 procedure.  
The  empirical  perspective  can  be  provided  with 
the  help  of  three  indicators.  The  first  one  is  the 
‘gross detection rate’ (GDR), showing the reported 
activities  of  the  procedure  in  detecting  issues, 
problems and/or likely barriers. The GDR is the 
ratio  of  the  sum  of  the  comments  and  detailed 
opinions of one year, divided by the total number 
of  notifications.  The  ‘gross  prevention  indicator’ 
(GPI)  focuses  on  prevention  we  are  pretty  sure 
about,  that  is,  the  share  in  percentage  of  all 
detailed opinions in all notifications in one year. 
However, the GPI is ‘gross’ because, although it is 
relatively easy to calculate from the TRIS website, 
it cannot be fully precise in identifying how many 
new  barriers  have  been  prevented  per  year 
(assuming that one draft law is tantamount to one 
barrier). The reason is that more than one member 
state  can  have  a  detailed  opinion  on  the  same 
notified draft law and/or that a member state as 
well  as  the  Commission  may  file  a  detailed 
opinion  on  the  same  draft  law.  The  ‘effective 
prevention  indicator’  (EPI)  filters  such  double 
counting from the calculation. The GPI is the share 
(in %) of the notifications that have attracted one 
or  more  detailed  opinions.  In  Figure  5  this 
empirical  perspective  has  been  brought  together 
for  the  last  few  years:  the  GDR  for  2004-11,  the 
GPI for 2004-11 and the EPI for 2010-11.  
Figure  5  shows  immediately  that,  after  many 
years of having Directive 98/34/EC, supported by 
CJEU  case  law,  such  as  Unilever  and  CIA-
Security, the trend is that still around half of the 
notified  draft  laws  lead  to  either  comments  or 
detailed  opinions  or  both  (2004  was  the  first 
Eastern enlargement year and is an outlier). When 
it comes to identified (likely) barriers in national 
draft  laws,  the  scores  are  much  lower. 
Nonetheless, the GPI hovers around 15%, which is 
far  from  trivial.  After  filtering  this,  the  EPI  for 
2010  and  2011  shows  9.7%  and  11.7%, 
respectively.  These  are  good  proxies  of  actually 
prevented barriers to intra-EU goods trade. Figure 
5  is  a  firm  proof  of  the  value  of  a  credible  and 
intrusive mechanism such as procedure 98/34 to 
pre-empt the steady erosion of the internal market 
for goods.  
Figure 5. Detection and effective prevention of barriers 
in Directive 98/34 
 
Note: GDR = gross detection rate; GPI = gross 
prevention indicator; EPI = effective prevention 
indicator. 
5.  Conclusions 
Preventing new technical barriers from arising is, 
by  its  nature,  a  never-ending  but  inconspicuous 
EU  activity.  It  would  seem  to  excite  few 
participants  in  the  EU  circuit  in  Brussels  and 
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national  capitals.  To  some  extent,  this  is 
understandable: by definition, one cannot observe 
what  is  (successfully)  prevented.  European 
business,  often  complaining  about  lingering 
barriers, may not even be aware how important 
this preventive EU/member state cooperation has 
become over time and how badly re-fragmented 
the  internal  goods  market  would  have  been 
without it. The procedure and its reporting have 
assumed a low profile, and the prevention issue is 
regarded as administrative and low key.  
This CEPS Policy Brief has shown with ample and 
persuasive  empirical  evidence  that  the  EU 
disposes  of  an  effective  low-cost  tool  in  the 
interface  between  the  Commission  and  the 
member  states  capable  of  pre-empting  an 
otherwise steady stream of new technical barriers. 
Over time, thousands of such barriers have been 
prevented. The great utility of what is, in effect, a 
quite  intrusive  instrument  of  EU  law  is  beyond 
any  doubt.  Indeed,  it  should  inspire  EU  policy-
makers to think of it as an example that, mutatis 
mutandis,  might  be  useful  in  other  areas  of  EU 
enforcement  as  well,  whether  in  the  internal 
market (for services ?) or outside it.  
We also wish to advance a few other conclusions 
that have emerged from our more detailed work 
done on 98/34 elsewhere.17 
One  striking  and  permanent  feature  of  ‘detailed 
opinions’  is  the  finding  that  a  national  technical 
draft  regulation  pays  no  attention  to  internal 
market  aspects  or  fails  to  incorporate  a  ‘mutual 
recognition  clause’  or  even  a  reference  to 
European or other (equivalent) national technical 
standards.  Thus,  even  for  2011,  the  analysis 
indicates  indeed  that  the  absence  of  a  'mutual 
recognition'  clause  is  still  a  principal  issue  that 
would  create  a  barrier  to  free  movement  in  the 
internal  market.  This  is  even  more  remarkable 
given  the  mutual  recognition  Regulation 
764/2008, in force since May 2009. This regulation 
shifts the burden of proof of non-equivalence to 
the  member  states  and  considerably  protects 
bona-fide  enterprises  (which  can  prove  with 
technical files the acceptance in another member 
state  usually  based  on  European  standards) 
desiring  market  access  by  various  strict 
                                                   
17 See Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012), to be published 
in  September  2012  as  a  CEPS  book.  More  detail  is 
provided there on some other aspects not treated here. 
procedural  obligations.  The  first  report  on  the 
working  of  this  regulation  notes  that  it  “(…) 
works by and large in a satisfactory way”. 
Knowing the history of Directive 98/34/EC (see 
e.g.  the  survey  by  Pelkmans  et  al.,  2000),  it  is 
interesting to find that, much like one and/or two 
decades  ago,  it  seems  difficult  for  specialized 
(technical) units inside certain national ministries, 
to master and understand EU law, or at least the 
basics with respect to the free movement of goods 
and the ‘New Approach’. Many of the same types 
of  mistakes  or  ‘failure  to  think  internal  market’ 
still  show  up  today.  However,  it must  be noted 
that  cooperation  of  national  ministries,  with 
national  enquiry  points  set  up  to  coordinate 
nationally  the  procedure  under  Directive 
98/34/EC,  has  improved  the  awareness  of  the 
notification  procedure.  Moreover,  some  learning 
has  taken  place  in  the  meantime:  from  1995–98 
(when  the  EU  had  only  15  member  states, 
compared  to  27  in  2010),  the  number  of  the 
Commission’s  detailed  opinions  amounted  to 
(respectively) 75, 105, 118 and 62 – all far above 
the 44 prepared in 2010 for more countries.  
Cases  in  agriculture  and  food,  and  related 
(phyto)sanitary issues, often tend to be regulated 
in  an  approach  quite  distinct  from  the  New 
Approach  or  mutual  recognition.  Detailed 
directives  nevertheless  leave  some  discretion  to 
member  states  (hence,  less  than  full 
harmonization)  and  the  inclination  to  use  that 
discretion is found to be fairly strong. This might 
lead  member  states  to  interpret  the  national 
discretion  more  widely  than  it  legally  is,  under 
such directives, which may, in turn lead to cases 
about the scope of a directive or about details in 
national (draft) laws which might conflict with the 
harmonized elements. 
Although  the  cases  of  a  missing  mutual 
recognition  clause  are  still  present,  one  can 
observe  a  gradual  shift  over  time  towards 
problems  with  directives  of  total  or  partial 
harmonization.  This  shift  signifies  that Directive 
98/34/EC  has  become,  much  more  than  in  the 
past,  a  special  monitoring  device  of  the 
implementation  of  EU  directives  in  the  range  of 
technical national laws and decrees (in addition to 
mutual recognition issues).  
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